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Abstract: This paper describes the plurality of Muslim 
responses to the modern conception of human rights, 
drawing in particular on Muslim interpretations of key 
human rights issues in the discourse of human rights and 
Islam −women’s rights, religious freedom and minority 
rights, and corporal punishment− in Egypt and Indonesia. 
The case studies of Egypt and Indonesia point to wide 
range of responses among Muslims to these issues, but also 
suggest that Islam is not incompatible with the modern 
conception of human rights. This paper argues that on the 
issues of human rights, Muslims do not share a single, 
monolithic stance. Instead, there is a variety of arguments 
based on various Islamic schools of thought and Islamic 
religious groups. As a result, the issues of human rights and 
their implementation have elicited a wide range of responses 
among Muslims. 
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Introduction 
Contemporary discussion in political science and human rights 
literature, especially in Western academic circles, often considers Islam 
and Human Rights incompatible. The sceptical outlook about the 
compatibility of Islam with universal human rights often points to 
conditions in Islamic countries as evidence that the religion itself is 
responsible for human rights violations.1 In all fairness, to some 
                                                 
1 A. S. Hikam, “Islam and human rights: tensions and possible cooperation: the case of 
Indonesia” in http://www.asiafoundation.org/publications/rpt_othe1.htm#Islamic, 
1997. (accessed 05/05/2003).  
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degrees Western criticisms of Muslims’ attitude toward human rights 
issues might be true. In fact, some Muslim countries do have a poor 
human rights record. This especially concerns the issues of women’s 
rights, religious freedom and minority rights, and corporal punish-
ment.2 
However, not all Western academics’ criticisms are entirely valid. 
This is because they often overload their arguments with stereotypes 
and prejudiced views of Islam. In this regard, Nasr argues that Islam 
has been portrayed by Western academics as “unchanged” and 
“unchangeable”, and as having little or nothing to offer on issues of 
global importance that have risen in the last few decades; issues such as 
democracy, pluralism and human rights.3 In fact, most Western 
academics have traditionally engaged in a discourse with Islam solely in 
order to “build an argument that there is a culturally based resistance 
to human rights in Islam”.4  
Other factors may contribute to the human rights violations in 
Muslim countries; factors that sometimes elude the attention of 
Western academics, most importantly, social, economic and political 
conditions. Moreover, Western commentators sometimes ignore 
Islam’s complexity, which harbors various, and frequently conflicting, 
interpretations of its inherent normative demands, it is also ignores the 
reality of modern Islamic movements that have created a plurality of 
socio-religious groups, ideas and strategies in Muslim countries. 
Consequently, the issues of human rights and their implementations 
have incited various responses among Muslims.  
With regard to the argument above, this paper investigates the 
plurality of Muslim opinions toward the issue of human rights in two 
influential Muslim countries, Egypt and Indonesia. They have been 
selected as case studies because of their size and regional influence. 
                                                 
2 These three aforementioned issues have become a source of resentment among 
Muslims in their responses to the modern conception of human rights. For instance, 
the objection of Saudi Arabia to the article 18 which regulate freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, including the right to change one’s religion and belief, which 
raised since the drafting of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see for instance 
(Ignatieff, 2002:102-16, 2001: 3-53). 
3 Nasr, S.H., The Heart of Islam: enduring values for humanity (New York: Harper San 
Francisco, 2002), p. xii. 
4 P.F. Strawson, Entity and Identity: and Other Essays (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 33. 
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Both countries have developed domestic human rights movements of 
considerable size and visibility. However, these movements have 
evolved in divergent circumstances. Egypt’s attitude toward interna-
tional human rights standards is ambivalent, while Indonesia, despite 
the persistence of patterns of human rights violations, human rights 
conditions, seem to be better than in Egypt or many other Muslim 
countries5. 
The discussion throughout this paper will focus on the following 
questions: does the experience of Egyptian and Indonesian Muslims 
support or deny the compatibility of Islam and human rights in 
practice? How do the experiences of Muslim countries (Egypt and 
human rights in practice? How do the experiences of Muslim countries 
(Egypt and Indonesia) in dealing with the issue of women rights 
religious freedom and minority rights and corporal punishment as the 
challenges to reconcile Islam and human rights?  
In addressing those questions this paper refers to previous works 
on the issue of the compatibility of Islam and human rights which 
define Muslims responses in the international human rights discourse. 
In this regard, scholars argue that participations of Muslims in the 
international human rights debate do not subscribe to single 
interpretation, but they have diverse opinions toward the notion of 
human rights. At least there are two major arguments Muslim respon-
                                                 
5 Broadly speaking, despite the persistence of deeply entrenched patterns of human 
rights violations, the human rights movement in Indonesia has worked within the 
broader context of a liberalizing polity in which substantive human rights progress is 
being made (Watch Indonesia, 2003, Freedom House, 2001). On the other hand, 
human rights situation in Egypt has deteriorated in the last two decades, and the 
human rights movement has worked in de-liberalising polity (N Hicks.“Does Islamist 
human rights activism offer a remedy to the crisis of human rights implementation in 
the Middle East?”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2002): pp.361–81.). 
Meanwhile, the Freedom House also suggests that Indonesia has made substantial 
progress in the field of human rights, despite many continuing problems in this area. 
The Freedom House, in its Annual Survey of Freedom Country Rights has attempted 
to quantify the level of freedom in states around the world since 1972-1973. This has 
been inevitably an imperfect process, with many detractors. Yet, it is interesting to 
note that in 1972-1973 Freedom House allotted Egypt a score of 6.6, placing it firmly 
in the not free category (Freedom House, 1973). In 1999-2000 Egypt’s score was 
virtually unchanged at 6.5 (Freedom House, 2000:596). Indonesia attained the score of 
4.5 placing it in the Partial Free category, in 1999-2000, having risen from a low of 7.5 
in 1997-1998. In the year 1972-1998, Indonesia under the authoritarian regime of 
Suharto, the Freedom House scored at 5.5, then virtually changed to be lower at 6.5 
and reached the peak at 7.6 during 1994-1996 (Freedom House, 2003). 
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ses in international human rights discourse: conservative and liberal 
argument. 
It is important to dispense with theoretical models that assume 
that Muslim politics and religion are all of a single stripe. Viewed 
historically, in fact, it is clear that Muslim politics was never monolithic 
but, like politics and culture in all great civilisations, plural and 
changing. Even in the early classical period of Umayyad and Abbasid 
empires during Islam’s first centuries, there was a lively pattern of 
extra-state religious organisations, centred around the twin institutions 
of learned Muslim scholars (Ulama) and religious law. Neither was 
totally controlled by state.6 
Islamic Responses  
in the International Human Rights Discourse 
In participating in the human rights discourse, Muslims all over the 
world are facing the underlying tension between religious tenets and 
the existing social, political and economic realities that are not always 
conducive to the realisation of those beliefs. Moreover, the dynamic of 
modern Islamic movements has left an indelible mark on Islam, 
namely in the plurality of socio-religious groups, ideas and strategies.7 
Consequently, human rights issues and their implementation have 
incited different responses among different Islamic groups.  
Bielefeldt has divided positions of Muslim authors into two groups 
which are called the conservative group and the liberal group. Conservative’ 
here means that the idea of human rights follows the conception of 
rights as prescribed by the Shari>‘ah. The Shari >‘ah, according to 
conservative Islam, has accommodated all the needs of the humanity, 
including human rights. However, using the Shari>‘ah for the basic 
concept of human rights in Islam mostly refers to the experience of 
pre-modern Islamic legal culture and the values of traditional societies, 
and does not examine whether they are still appropriate or not to 
modern society.8 Thus, conservative Islam tends to neglect the conflict 
                                                 
6 Robert W. Hefner, “Public Islam and the problem of democratisation”, Sociology of 
Religion, Vol. 62, No. 4 (2001), p 3. 
7 D. Eickelman, and J. Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); John. L. Esposito and J.O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
8 Ann Elizabeth-Mayer, Islam and human rights : tradition and politics (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1995), pp. 167-8. 
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between the limited view of the Shari >‘ah on human rights and the 
modern concept of human rights.  
Moreover, using the Shari >‘ah as the main reference to the human 
rights concept in Islam has resulted in an ambivalent attitude of among 
Muslims toward international standards of human rights. This is 
because, on the one hand, there is the pull of historical religious 
traditions which sanction discrimination on the grounds of religion and 
gender. On the other hand, there is push of modernist domestic and 
international forces in favour of human rights and against discrimi-
nation on the grounds of religion or gender.9  
In order to implement the principles of human rights according to 
Islamic law, conservatives advocate legal formalistic strategies. This 
approach is based on the idea that the formalisation of Islam in all 
dimensions of life, through laws and supported by the state, is the only 
option to fully implement Islamic teachings. The necessity of 
establishing an Islamic state or developing an Islamic society based on 
the Shari>‘ah as a prerequisite is indispensable.10 
Meanwhile, according to liberal Muslims, Islam and human rights 
are not totally incompatible. Some of their basic principles are not 
mutually exclusive. Moreover, liberal Muslims do not deny the tension 
between Islamic principles of human rights and the rights stipulated in 
the UDHR. According to liberal Islam, the rights in Islam which refer 
to the classical Shari >‘ah need to be re-interpreted because they are not 
appropriate to be implemented in the modern era.   
The Islamic liberal view on human rights issues goes one step 
further than its conservative counterpart by attempting to provide 
fresh interpretation of the classical Shari >‘ah. According to Islamic 
liberalists, the Shari >‘ah was shaped and developed in the early Muslim 
era and was justified by the historical context.11 Moreover, the classical 
Shari >‘ah does not form a comprehensive legal system but consists 
mainly of general religious and ethical principles, such as prayer and 
fasting, solidarity within the community, respect between the genders 
                                                 
9 A. A. An-Naim, Towards an Islamic Reformation: civil liberties, human rights and international 
law (New York: Syracuse, 1990), p. 178. 
10 D. Brumberg, “Islamists and the politics of consensus”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, (2002), p. 110 (1994). 
11 A.A.An-Naim, “Towards an Islamic Reformation”, p. 170. 
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and tolerance towards minorities.12 Therefore, with regard to the 
current discourse of human rights, the Shari >‘ah as a source of Islamic 
rights may need to be re-developed further in order to create an alter-
native formulation of Islamic public law that eliminates the limitations 
of Shari >‘ah on human rights issues.13  
The breakthrough of liberal Muslims is a significant contribution 
to the discourse of Islam and human rights.14 Liberal Muslims facilitate 
reforms both in the field of law and in theology. These critical 
approaches pave the way for political and legal changes. Moreover, 
liberal Muslims also provide a new awareness of the humane character 
of the Qur’anic revelation which is the most important source of the 
Shari >‘ah. Liberal Muslims’ attitudes reflect the responsibility of the 
human being as deputy of God (khalifahs) on earth, where they must 
respect human dignity and honour, as is stated in the Qur’anic verse 
(QS) 2:30. In another Qur’anic verse, it is mentioned that God has 
bestowed a special trust upon humankind, elevating the human person 
above all cosmic power (QS, 33:72). 
The main concern of liberal Muslims is how to eliminate the 
limitation of the Shari >‘ah’s view on human rights. For instance, on the 
issue of religious liberty, liberal Muslims like Mohammed Talbi 
(1991:31) suggest the necessity to recognize that in relation to religious 
tolerance, the Shari >‘ah has a limited view. Thus, he suggests that a faith-
ful Muslim’s submission to the unfathomable divine should lead to the 
mutual recognition of human beings in their freedom of conscience, 
because no one can pretend to know God’s plans concerning his or 
her fellow humans.  
In light of the discussion above, it suggests that the plurality of 
Muslim argument in international human right debate is inescapable. 
The diverse of Muslims community in societal and religious life has 
forced Muslim to participate differently toward international human 
rights discourse. The next discussion delineates the Muslim experience 
in Egypt and Indonesia in dealing with human rights issue.  
 
                                                 
12 M. S. Al-Asmawy, L’Islamisme contre L’Islam (Paris La Ecouverte and Cairo: Edition 
La Fikr, 1989), pp. 124-25. 
13 A. A. An-Naim, “Towards an Islamic Reformation”, pp. 170-74. 
14 H. Bielefeldt, “Muslim voices in the human rights debate”, Human Rights Quarterly, 
Vol. 17, No. 4 (1995), pp.587–617. 
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Egypt, Islam and Human Rights:  
Conservative Islam Experience  
The attitude of Egyptian Muslim to international human rights 
discourse is considerably ambiguity. On the one hand Egypt has 
actively involved in international human rights debate since the 
drafting of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and it has ratified 
many form of international covenants since 1967, among them are: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in 
1982. However, on the other hand the implementation of human 
rights norms in Egypt remains low.15  
There are, of course, many explanations on the ambiguity attitude 
of Egyptian toward international human rights principles, such as 
political condition, social and economic circumstances. However, the 
most significant cause is the interpretation of modern conception of 
human rights which has been put on the contradiction position with 
Shari >‘ah. While the Shari >‘ah has been placed as the main sources of 
constitutional law, automatically the main reference to human rights 
principle in this country mainly refer to the rights that articulated in the 
Shari >‘ah. 
Meanwhile, as it has been argued earlier in this paper that using 
Shari >‘ah as the main reference to the human rights concept in Islam has 
resulted in an ambivalent attitude of among Muslims toward 
international standards of human rights, likewise in Egypt. This 
ambivalence is reflected in Egypt’s subscription to international human 
rights documents that it cannot uphold within its national jurisdiction 
because of the role of Shari >‘ah in the domestic legal system.  
For instance, in ratifying the convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Egypt has entered 
reservations on Article 16 (United Nations, 2002). Whereas this Article 
requires complete equality between men and women in all matters 
relating to marriage and family relations during the marriage and upon 
its dissolution, Egypt’s reservations stipulate that its obligations “must 
be without prejudice to the Islamic Shari >‘ah provisions” (United 
Nations, 2002). According to An- Na'im this reservation indicates that 
                                                 
15 N. Hicks, “Does Islamist human rights activism offer a remedy to the crisis of 
human rights implementation in the Middle East?”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, 
No. 2 (2002), pp.361–81. 
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Egypt is “aware of the conflict between the international obligation 
established by that article and its own Shari>‘ah personal law for 
Muslim”.16 
Considering to the fact above, it may fair to put Egyptian Muslims’ 
attitude into theoretical landmark of conservative as mentioned earlier 
in tis paper. Some scholar also consider that the discourse of 
compatibility between Islam and modern conception of human rights 
in Egypt has been dominated by the conservative Islam.17 According 
to Dalacoura the conservatism toward issues of human rights in Egypt 
has been exhibited by three actors:18 ulama, Islamic activists and the 
government.19 The ulama are the learned men of Islam who are centred 
in the Al-Azhar University, the most to educational thoughts and 
practices contradicted and even opposed the modernist premises.20  
The Egyptian ulama, in matters pertaining to human rights, ought 
to be considered as conservative. Dalacoura argues that many of them 
see the Shari>‘ah as a total way of life and consider its imposition 
imperative—even though they may disagree on what the Shari >‘ah 
means and on the permissibility of ijtihad.21 A salient example of the 
conservatism of the ulama toward human rights occurred when the 
Islamic Research Academy of Cairo, which is affiliated with the Azhar 
University, internationally prestigious institution of higher education in 
Sunni Islam. This institution is a centre of conservative Islamic 
thought.22 The Azhar’s contributions produced the rights provision in 
                                                 
16 A. A. An-Naim, “Towards an Islamic Reformation”, p. 179. 
17 K. Dalacoura, Islam Liberalism and Human Rights: implications for international relations 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1998) 123-5; N. Hicks, “Does Islamist human rights activism 
offer a remedy,” pp. 370-4; F. Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: I B 
Tauris Halliday, 2003), p. 157-8. 
18 From a sociological perspective, Egyptians seem to behave conservatively in society. 
As Yadlin argues, some sociological studies have shown that social attitudes in Egypt 
are very conservative. Traditional views and suspicion of authority predominate; social 
atomism is paramount. The attitudes of the younger generation on the family and the 
position of women are similarly conservative. Also, authenticity is conceived of as 
diametrically opposed to Westernisation. (1983:161-3). 
19 K. Dalacoura, “Islam Liberalism and Human Rights”, pp. 129-30. 
20 G. Talhami, The Mobilization of Muslim Women in Egypt (Gainesville, Florida: 
University of Florida Press, 1996), p. 33. 
21 K Dalacoura, “Islam Liberalism and Human Rights”, p. 126. 
22 Ann-Elizabeth Mayer, “Islam and Human Rights,” p. 22. 
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the “Draft of the Islamic Constitution”. It was published in 1979 in 
Volume 51 of the Azhar journal, Majallat al-Azhar. According to 
Mayer, the rights provisions in the Draft of the Islamic Constitution 
appeared to represent an official position of that institution as to what 
rights should be recognised in a political system based on Sunni 
Islamic principles.23 The language of human rights in this draft simply 
merged with the conception of rights in the Shari >‘ah.   
The second actor is Islamic activists, associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamic groups, such as Gamaat Islamiyya. Their 
commitment to human rights is superficial.24 In this regard Hicks 
argues that Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood, hold views on 
human rights which are “backward-looking, obscurantist and a threat 
to basic freedoms”.25 Thus, as Hasan argues an Islamist might not be a 
good partner to implement human rights in Muslim countries.26 
Islamists are interested in human rights as a way of attacking a 
government or state authorities which they oppose; thus, should they 
come to power, “they would have no compunction about denying 
rights to others that they had claimed for themselves”.27  
Moreover, according to Egyptian Islamists, any talk of human 
rights beyond the Shari >‘ah can be construed as ja>hiliyya. The term of 
ja>hiliyya was highlighted by an Egyptian radical Muslim thinker, Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-66). It refers to Arabian society during the century prior to 
Muhammad’s prophesy, and translates “the Age of Ignorance” 
(Shepard, 2003:522).28 Islamists use this term to describe the behaviour 
of Western society and its tendency to discredit Islamic culture, morals 
                                                 
23 The Azhar draft may be seen as a Sunni response to the political repercussions of 
the Iranian Revolution and an effort to demonstrate that Sunni Islam was not bereft of 
resources to fashion a constitution for a modern government. Mayer (1995:22).  
24 On the Brotherhood’s pragmatic shift towards support of democracy, see for 
instance Ally and Werner and Abeh-Kotob (1982:352:4) (1995:321-39). 
25 N. Hicks, “Does Islamist human rights activism offer a remedy”, pp. 362. 
26 B.E. Hasan, “Toward human rights enforcement in the Arab world: a comprehen-
sive strategy”, in Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (eds), Islam and Justice: Debating 
the Future of Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, 1997), p. 147. 
27 N. Hicks, “Does Islamist human rights activism offer a remedy”, p. 367. 
28 William E. Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic activism: a translation and critical analysis of 
Social justice in Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003), p. 522. 
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and the Islamic way of thinking.29 Therefore, the idea of using 
standards on human rights issues based on Western concepts is 
regarded as ja>hiliyya. 
The third actor is the Egyptian government, which has failed to 
understand the genuine force of Islamic liberalism. Many political 
observers in Egypt believe that the state interpretation of Islam is a 
mixture of modernist and traditionalist elements without, however, a 
clear emphasis on Islamic liberalism.30 For instance, in the era of 
Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Sadat lacked understanding of the major 
issues surrounding a genuine Islamic liberalism and was content to 
appeal arbitrarily to whichever element of Islam served his policies. As 
a result, Islam was moulded as an integral part of his political make 
up.31 He projected the image of the “believing president” and the 
“patriarch of Egyptian family”.32 In many instances, Sadat’s attitude 
toward modernity and Islam seemed to be contradictory. For example, 
he claimed that he was committed to the sovereignty of the people as 
the supreme authority and source of legitimacy in Egypt, but he also 
argued that the ruler was ordained by the Allah. Sadat asserted that he 
had re-established the rule of law, but he also implied that he, as 
personification of the country as a whole, conceded liberties and rights 
to the people.33 
Meanwhile, the current government under Mubarak, although 
Mubarak is less outspoken on Islam, and his outlook more secular, he 
has had to appease the powerful Islamic forces in the country. For 
instance, Esposito noted that,34 under Mubarak the Egyptian 
government tried to placate the Islamists by promising to revise 
existing legislation to bring it more in tune with the Shari >‘ah. His 
strategy to gain popular support from Muslims relies mainly on 
“establishment Islam”. Mubarak supports the established religious 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 523. 
30 John L. Esposito and J.O. Voll, “Islam and Democracy”, 174-5; Hafez, 1997: 302; K. 
Dalacoura, Islam Liberalism and Human Rights, p. 138. 
31 John L. Esposito and J.O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, p. 174. 
32 K Dalacoura, Islam Liberalism and Human Rights, p. 125. 
33 Ibid. 
34 John L. Esposito, The Islamic threat: myth or reality? (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), pp. 97-100. 
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institutions, such as the al-Azhar University and the ministry of 
religious Endowments (Awkaf).  
In this regard, Dalacoura argues that the official religious 
establishment has a crucial role to play in the interpretation of religion, 
and in some instances the government needs them to support its 
public policies.35 For example, during the reversal of political 
liberalisation from 1977-1981, the Azhar, through its periodical 
Majallat al-Azhar, argued that the government could wage jihad against 
civil disorder. On other occasions, the government supported the 
policies or opinion of the Azhar on some Islamic issues in society. For 
example in the recent controversy over the publication of novels 
deemed offensive to Islam, the state has defended Al-Azhar in the 
banning of books.36 By doing this, the government wants to show its 
people that the state has a commitment to defend Islam.37 
It transpires from the above discussion that none of the discourses 
on human rights and Islam in Egypt is predominantly liberal. Neither 
government, nor opposition (Islamists) are proponents of Islamic 
liberalism proper. In other words, conservative Islam is more 
dominant in interpreting human rights for Egyptian society than liberal 
Islam. In some instances, the liberals or reformers occupy a difficult 
position in Egypt. They have to suffer physical threats or terror from 
conservative or radical Islamic groups, or even from the state. For 
instance, in the 1992, Muslim militants assassinated the Egyptian 
human rights activist and essayist Farag Fouda (Human Rights Watch, 
1993). Moreover, in 1997, Egypt’s Hight Court ruled that the writing 
of a Cairo University professor, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, were tanta-
mount to apostasy. The latest issue is the detention of human rights 
and civil society activist, Saad Edin Ibrahim. These three incidents 
show that outspoken Muslim reformers in Egypt are threatened; in 
some instances their lives are in jeopardy. 
                                                 
35 K Dalacoura, Islam Liberalism and Human Rights, p. 126. 
36 President Mubarak has cautioned writers and intellectuals against offending the 
religious sensibility of the people. The rehabilitation of the Muslim Brotherhood, after 
several years of severe repression, whereby its members now sit again in the 
parliament, and its list emerged victorious in the recent bar association elections, 
suggests a modus vivendi whereby the state defends Islamist positions in the social and 
cultural spheres, in return for which the Brotherhood will stay out of security policy 
and pushing for political reform. See for instance, Springborg (1989:ch.2). 
37 N. Hicks, “Does Islamist human rights activism offer a remedy”, p. 373. 
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The outlook of conservatism is particularly salient when one 
analyses the attitude of ulama, Islamic activists and government toward 
reconciling Islam and modern conception of  human rights concept, 
on the issue such as women’s rights, religious freedom and minority 
rights, and corporal punishment.  
Women’s Rights  
Despite the growing presence of women in the public sphere in 
recent times, the status of women in Egypt remains grave. Women 
remain subordinate and do not enjoy rights on equal footing with 
men.38 In this regard, Elizabeth Fernea argues that the growing 
number of women in the public sphere has not been paralleled by 
more equity.39 She notes that the large number of university graduates 
among Egyptian women, their increased presence in the public sphere, 
the fact that they have come to occupy top positions in the economy 
and in the states apparatus, are countered by high rates of illiteracy 
among women, minimal political participation, declining representation 
in parliament and the reappearance of modest dress.40 
While there are many factors that account for the prevailing gender 
gap in society, Guenena and Wassef suggest that the problem of 
gender inequality in Egypt is mainly caused by the dominance of the 
conservative interpretation of religious teachings on women’s issues, 
coupled with patriarchal culture in society.41 The conservative 
interpretation of women’s issues according to the Shari >‘ah, has 
reinforced the idea that women should retreat from the public sphere 
and urged women to be more active in the private sphere.42 
                                                 
38 N. Guenena and N. Wassef, Unfulfilled Promises: women’s rights in Egypt (Cairo: West 
Asia and North Africa Regional Office, Population Council, 1999), p. 5. 
39 Equity here means equal opportunity for equal contribution. The emphasis on 
women as agents of production within this view constituted a challenge to the sex-role 
dichotomy that denied women’s role instrumentally and therefore their due share in 
the production process. For further discussion on the concept of equity, see Kabeer 
(1994) and Guenena and Wassef (1999).  
40 E. W. Fernea, In Search Of Islamic Feminism: one woman’s global journey (New York: 
Doubleday, 1998), pp. 241-2. 
41 Ibid, p. 31. 
42 M. Badran, “Competing agenda: feminists, Islam and the state in nineteenth and 
twentieth century Egypt”, in D. Kandiyoti (ed.), Women, Islam, and the State (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), p. 10. 
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The conservative interpretation of the issues of women’s rights is 
reflected by the so called the Azhar Draft of the Islamic Constitution, 
which suggests that women are the safeguard of family, and the role of 
women in the domestic sphere is therefore more important than in the 
public sphere.43 It implies that, when women choose to work outside 
home, the type of job must not be removed far from the domestic 
business. As is mentioned in Article 38 of the Azhar Constitution, 
women are allowed to work within the limits of the precepts of the 
Shari >‘ah (h}udu >d ah}ka>m al-Shari >‘ah al Isla >miyya). The limits of the Shari>‘ah 
might be unclear because the Azhar Constitution does not explain 
them further. However, according to Mayer (1995:114), because many 
conservatives Islam believe that a woman is allowed to work as long as 
her husband give her permission, their job must be suitable only for 
women, and they will be barred from work that brings them into 
inappropriate proximity with men.44  
In the Azhar Draft, Article 8 of provide that the state should 
encourage early marriage and provide “the means according to which 
wife would obey her husband and look after her children and consider 
keeping the family the first of her tasks”.45 This shows the extent of 
the conservatism of the ‘ulama in Egypt (Azhar) toward women’s 
rights. The Azhar Constitution also suggests that women are to avoid 
immodest or provocative clothing or ornaments, and according to 
Islamic conservatives this means that heavy veiling and no makeup is 
de rigueur for women whenever they are exposed to the sight of men 
who are not members of their own family circles.46  
The above synthesis of women’s rights is also adopted by activists 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood’s views on 
women, although not uniform, tend to converge on the fact that there 
is a fundamental inequality between the sexes, which is often explained 
away as being a ‘difference in roles’ or about the protection of 
women.47 This view seems to be detrimental to women’s rights. 
                                                 
43 Ann Elizabeth-Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, p. 113. 
44 Ibid., p. 114. 
45 Ibid., p. 115. 
46 Ibid. 
47 K. Dalacoura, “Islam Liberalism and Human Rights”, p 128. Further discussion on the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s view of society, especially the question of female participation 
in the Islamist movement, is, however, extremely complex because the movement in 
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However, it is widely supported and even more pronounced among 
members of Gama >at Isla>miyya, a radical Muslim group which is based 
on the campuses, and promotes conservatism vis-a-vis women and the 
separation of sexes. Moreover, Gama >at Isla>miyya also enforces Islamic 
dress and bullies unmarried couples seen together in public.48 
The government’s position on women’s rights is ambivalent.49 For 
instance, as mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, the government 
espoused some reservations based on the Shari >‘ah when it signed 
international conventions on discrimination against women. Another 
example is the government’s inconsistency in reforming family law. 
The first Family Law code was introduced in 1925, and amended in 
1929. The Family Law in general deals with women as part of the 
regulation of the organisation of the family, not as individuals with 
their own separate or equal rights.50 Anwar Sadat reformed the Family 
Law in 1979, slightly enhancing women’s rights. Women were given 
the right to divorce should their husband take a second wife and to be 
informed in the event of divorce and be given alimony; they were also 
given greater rights of custody. However, this family law was amended 
in 1985 under President Mubarak to meet the demand of Islamists 
who believed0 that the 1979 Family Law violated the Shari >‘ah. 
Thus, the situation with women’s rights in Egypt remains grave. In 
general, women continue to suffer discrimination from the state and 
society. This is because conservative interpretation of religious 
teachings about women persists and is coupled with the prevailing of 
patriarchal culture in society. 
Religious Freedom and Minority Rights 
The conservatism of Muslims in Egypt can be seen from the issues 
of religious freedom and the rights of minorities. Conversion from 
Islam to another religion is regarded as apostasy, and is punishable by 
death. The most prominent example, as mentioned before, was the 
                                                                                                      
fact empowers many women rather than restricts them. See Mitchell (1969:254-9), and 
Farah (1983:61-4). 
48 G. Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: the Prophet and Pharaoh, translated by J. 
Rothschild (London: al-Saqi Books, 1985). 
49 N. Guenena and N. Wassef, Unfulfilled Promises: women’s rights in Egypt (Cairo: West 
Asia and North Africa Regional Office, Population Council, 1999) p. 1. 
50 M. Hatem, “The enduring alliance of nationalism and patriarchy in Muslim personal 
status laws: the case of modern Egypt”, Feminist Issues, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1986), p. 28. 
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murder of Farag Fouda by a member of Gamaat Islamiyya. He was 
accused of apostasy, because he suggested that secularism should be 
applied in Egypt. This assassination gained support from a radical 
Muslim cleric, Sheikh Ahmad Ghazali, who believed that secularists 
like Farag Fouda were apostates who should be put to death by the 
government. If the government failed to carry out that “duty” then 
pious individuals were to do so.51 
In addition to the issue of religious conversion, the US State 
Department Country Report 2003 revealed that there are no 
restrictions on the conversion of non-Muslim to Islam. However, in 
cases involving conversion from Islam to Christianity, authorities have 
charged several converts with violating laws prohibiting the 
falsification of documents. Converts who fear government harassment 
if they officially register the change from Islam to Christianity, have 
altered their identification cards and other official documents 
themselves to reflect their new religious affiliation.52 
Religious tolerance in Egypt reflects a negative picture, where the 
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims is not always easy. 
The Constitution mentions that Islam is the official state religion and a 
primary source of legislation (Article 2). Accordingly, religious 
practices that conflict with the Shari>‘ah are prohibited. However the 
practice of Christianity or Judaism does not conflict with the Shari>‘ah. 
Consequently, the existence of other religions streams is not welcome 
in Egypt, such as a small group of Bahai. Although, the existence of 
Christian (Copts) is recognised by the state, in many cases they have 
difficulty building places to worship. Some conditions have to be met 
by the Coptic community to build a church. These conditions are set 
down in a 1934 Minister of Interior decree, which is based on an 1856 
Ottoman decree governing the building of places of worship for non-
Muslims.53  
There have been some reports that Christians have had difficulties 
building a church and have become subject to security authorities’ 
approval. During the period covered by the International Religious 
                                                 
51 Times Cairo, “Remembering Egypt’s Cassandra”, 9 January 2002.  
52 US Department of State, 2003a. ‘Egypt’, International Religious Freedom Report 2003, 
Washington, DC: US Department of State. Available online at http://www.state.gov-
/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13994.htm [accessed on 11 May 2003]. 
53 Ibid. 
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Freedom Report 2003, the President approved a total of 23 permits for 
church-related construction, including one permit for the construction 
of a new church; 2 permits for demolition and reconstruction of 
churches; 10 permits for churches previously constructed without 
authorisation, 8 permits for construction of additional church facilities; 
and 1 permit for cemetery construction.54 The restriction on building 
churches in some instances has triggered conflict between Muslims and 
Copts, for instance the 1972 riot in Alexandria which destroyed Coptic 
houses, shops and Church.55 Thus, although the existence of 
Christianity and Judaism is recognised by state and the Shari >‘ah, these 
religions still suffer from acts of discrimination. 
The discriminatory attitude toward non-Muslims also comes from 
Muslims in general. Their behaviour has been inspired by the 
conservative view on Islam. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood 
recognises the rights of non-Muslims in society, but in numerous 
instances Christians, and particularly Jews, are pictured in their 
publications as inherently “hostile” to Islam and the growth in the 
Brotherhood’s influence has contributed, “undeniably”, to inter-
communal tension between Muslims and Copts.56 Islamic militant 
groups demand that, as a consequence of the enforcement of the 
Shari >‘ah, non-Muslims should be regarded as dhimmi, and therefore, 
Copts must pay the jizya tax and be barred from the Army of an the 
Islamic state.57 
On the state and discriminatory practices in Egypt, International 
Religious Freedom Reports 2003 notes that although the Constitution 
provides for equal public rights and duties without discrimination due 
to religion or creed, discrimination against non-Muslims does exist. No 
Christians serve as governors, presidents of public universities, or 
deans. Furthermore, International Religious Freedom Reports 2003 
reveals that the practices of discrimination against Christian occur in 
the public sector; in staff appointment to public universities; in 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55 M. Khalil, The Copts in the Immigration Countries: a field study of the troubles of the home 
country and citizenship (Cairo: Dar-Al Khayal, 1999), p. 7; John L. Esposito and J.O. Voll, 
“Islam and Democracy”, p.188. 
56 Dalacoura, Islam Liberalism and Human Rights, p. 128. 
57 Al Ahram Weekly, 17–23 April 1997. Available online at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ 
[accessed on 27 November 2003]. 
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payment of Muslim imams through public funds (the Christian clergy 
are paid by private church funds); and refusal to admit Christians to 
Al-Azhar university (which is publicly funded). In general, university 
training programs for Arabic-language teachers refuse to admit non-
Muslims because the curriculum involves the study of the Qur’an.58  
Corporal Punishment 
Certain provisions of the Islamic penal code, such as hand 
amputation for thieves, rajam for those who have committed adultery 
or the death penalty for those who convicted apostates might not be 
recognised by the criminal law in Egypt. However, practices like 
torture or maltreatment of those who are arrested or detained are 
common and persistent in police stations or detention centres. There 
are numerous and credible reports that security forces torture and 
mistreat citizens, including at police stations. For instance, the 
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) reported 59 
incidents of torture in March 2001 in police stations and other 
detention centres, in which 11 victims died. The report included nine 
cases of citizens apparently unaffiliated with any political group or 
trend (EOHR, 2003). In 2003, the practice of torture continued, for 
instance Amnesty International has noted the arrest of an Egyptian 
activist for Palestine who has been caught and tortured at a police 
station.59 
Within conservative Islam, however, the desire to implement 
Islamic penal codes remains strong, or at least conservative Muslims 
believe that Islamic penal codes can be validly implemented in modern 
society. For instance, Sheikh Ahmad Ghazali’s opinion concerning the 
murder of Farag Fouda, as mentioned before, is evidence of that. In 
this regard, Moosa argues that death penalty for apostates was not 
derived from the Qur’an, but is simply referred to in the Prophetic 
reports or the Hadith.60 It means that the practice of death penalty for 
                                                 
58 US Department of State, 2003a. ‘Egypt’, International Religious Freedom Report 2003, 
Washington, DC: US Department of State. Available online at http://www.state.gov/-
g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13994.htm (accessed on 11 May 2003). 
59 Amnesty International Egypt (London: Amnesty International, 2003a). Available 
online at http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-egy/index (accessed on 27 August 
2003). 
60 E. Moosa, “The dilemma of Islamic rights schemes”, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 
15, No. 1–2 (2000/2001), p. 202. 
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apostates might apply to the social milieu of early Islamic history, when 
apostates could be regarded as disturbing social harmony. Therefore, it 
might be not appropriate in the current situation.  
In light to the whole discussion above, the discourse in Egypt on 
the compatibility between Islam and contemporary conceptions of 
human rights in that country is dominated by conservative Islam, 
which simply merges the conception of human rights with the 
language of the classic Shari >‘ah. It might be difficult to draw a 
conclusion that the Shari>‘ah is the cause of the deterioration of human 
rights conditions in Egypt, but the modern day conservative 
interpreters of Shari >‘ah, to some degree, have contributed to the 
ambiguity and ambivalence of Egyptians toward international 
standards of human rights.    
 
Indonesia, Islam and Human Rights:  
Liberal-Moderate Islam Experience 
In relation to human rights issues in Indonesia, the views of neo-
modernists are very influential in the public discourse. Neo-modernists 
using the liberal argument opine that the Islamic and the modern, 
secular perspectives on human rights do not contradict one another; 
they even share communalities reflected in some basic principles. This 
makes it possible to open the door for reconciliation and cooperation 
between them.61 A study on the response of Muslim intellectuals in 
Indonesia to the concept of human rights shows that “all Muslim 
intellectuals in Indonesia support the idea of modern human rights” 
although their opinions on them vary.62 
The liberal perspective on human rights and Islam is also found in 
the views of the ulama, which associate with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) . 
The Nahdlatul Ulama represents the traditional ulama and their disciples, 
but Nahdlatul Ulama’s view on Islam and modernity seems to be more 
accommodative and modern.63 On the issues of human rights and 
                                                 
61 A.S. Hikam, “Islam and human rights: tensions and possible cooperation: the case of 
Indonesia” in http://www.asiafonadtion.org/publications/rpt_othe1.htm#Islamic, 
1997. (accessed 05/05/2003). 
62 M. Abdillah, “Theological responses to the concepts of democracy and human 
rights: the case of the contemporary Indonesian Muslim intellectual”, Studia Islamika: 
Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, Vol. 3, No.1 (1996.), p. 23. 
63 M. Woodward, “Indonesia, Islam and the prospect for democracy”, SAIS Review, 
Vol. 21, No. 2 (2001), p. 32. 
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Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama has produced a fatwa> (religious decree) at the 
National Conference of Ulama NU in 1997 (Musyawarah Nasional ‘Alim 
Ulama).64 The fatwa> revealed that human rights need to be respected 
and upheld in Indonesia by all components of the nation, including the 
ulama, umara (government) and umma (society). The fatwa> mentions five 
basic principles: (1) the protection of religious consciousness and 
observances (h}ifz} al-din); (2) the protection of life (h }ifz} al-nafs); (3) the 
protection of thought and freedom of opinion (h }ifz} al-‘aql); (4) the 
protection of property (h}ifz} al-amwal); and (5) the right to enter into 
marriage and protection of reproductive rights (both are included 
under the rubric of h}ifz} al-nasl) (PBNU and Lajnah Ta’lif Wan Nasir, 
1997:51-53).65 
The five principles above parallel and perhaps are similar to the 
universal principles of human rights. Therefore, the ulama’s NU 
recommended to the National Board of NU to use those principles in 
struggling for human rights in Indonesia. At the National Conference 
of NU (Muktamar XXX), the conference recommended the 
government to implement human rights legislation and bring to justice 
the perpetrators of human rights violations in the past (NU online, 
2003). 
While neo-modernists support the idea of human rights, they also 
suggest a self-criticism of the Shari>‘ah point of view on human rights. 
For instance, Munawir Sadzali (d.2005)66 argues that, to increase 
Muslims’ participation in international human rights discourses, 
                                                 
64 The Nahdlatul Ulama held a National Conference of Ulama on 17-21 November 
1997 in Pondok Pesantren Qomarul Huda, Lombok Tengah Nusa Tenggara Barat. Besides 
discussing some issues related to organizational matters, the conference also discussed 
the current agenda which relating to daily life, such as social, economic, and political 
problems. 
65 Interestingly enough, although these five concepts appear to constitute the neo-
modern outlook, these principles are taken from a thousand year old concept 
contained in the literature of Islamic jurisprudence and is known as kulliyat al khams 
(simply “five basic necessities”). They are taught within NU’s intellectual tradition and 
transmitted in pondok pesantren (Falaakh, 2001:36). These five principles can be also 
found in Kamali (1991) especially Chapter XIII, see also Masood (1989), especially 
Chapter 4-5 and 7. 
66 Munawir Sadzali is one of the leading Muslim intellectual in Indonesia. He was 
Minister of Religious Affairs (1983-1993), a former diplomat with an education in both 
pesantren and the West. He suggests re-actualizing the Sharia in a way that is more 
responsive to the demands of Indonesian Muslims, who live in a plural society. 
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Muslims should look not only to the relative texts (nass zanni) of the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, which certainly can be interpreted, but also 
their absolute texts (nass qat’i), which are not interpretable.67 Sadzali 
uses an example about the issue of slavery and right to life as a free 
human being. According to Sadzali, it is true that the Prophet appealed 
to slave owners to treat their slaves more humanely or set to them free 
all together, but up until the death of the Prophet Islam did not totally 
abolish slavery. Meanwhile, in modern times, humanity has 
condemned slavery in all its manifestations as a human evil. If Muslims 
had maintained the verses that recognised slavery as part of the status 
quo of the Prophet’s period and had not finished what the Prophet 
had begun in setting slaves free, they would not have been able to 
discuss the question of human rights, because the most fundamental 
human right is the right to life as a free human being.68 
In responding to the “open-mindedness” (my emphasis) of 
Indonesian Muslims toward issues of human rights, the government 
takes a pragmatic position. In this context, government plays a safe 
role when dealing with Islamic forces, especially if it is touching upon 
issues of democracy and human rights. During the Suharto regime, for 
instance, the state attempted to galvanise support from Islamic groups 
and leaders in order to respond to the increasing scrutiny domestically 
and internationally, in the field of human rights (Hikam, 1997).69 
                                                 
67 Munawir Sadzali, “Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam” in Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima (ed.), 
Polemik Reakualisasi Ajaran Islam (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988), p. 9. 
68 The idea of reinterpreting the Sharia is also suggested by prominent Islamic scholars 
such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid. They call for understanding 
Islam through contextualised ijtihad.  Nurcholish Madjid (1980:196) for instance believes 
that ijtihad provides the manner in which social and historical phenomena can be 
evaluated to determine their continued correctness and appropriateness to current 
cultural situations. Similarly, Wahid as quoted in Istiadah (1995:5) argues that Islam 
must be understood through contextualised ijtihad, where the social teaching of Islam are 
to be reinterpreted in accordance with demands of a rapidly changing society and in 
response to modernity. Therefore, the social teaching of Islam in Indonesia must be 
understood as a characteristic of the Indonesian community, which is pluralist and 
tolerant. 
69 The religiously motivated riots (September 1995) in East Timor may be relevant 
here. In this case, many Islamic leaders were provoked by the incident, which 
unwittingly caused them to react negatively toward other religious groups. This in turn 
strengthened the existing prejudice toward Islam among non-Muslims in the province 
and strained their relations. See, for instance, Simmons (2000:57-77) also Hikam 
(1997:5). 
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Moreover, the state defended the idea of cultural relativism concerning 
universal human rights by appropriating and reinterpreting existing 
traditions, cultures and religions. In this case, the government 
repeatedly stressed that the principles of universal human rights are not 
appropriate to be applied in Indonesia because they would contradict 
the religious and cultural values of Indonesia. According to Hikam 
(1997) this only served to legitimise the state under the pretext of 
representing the interest of the entire community, as opposed to 
individual basic rights.  
On the other hand, Islam is repressed when the government thinks 
that it will threaten its power. Many Islamic activists have suffered 
from state oppression. According to Asia Watch Report, Muslim 
activists have been charged with offences ranging from using violence 
in pursuit of the establishment of an Islamic state to undermining the 
state ideology, but in many cases Muslims were persecuted on the basis 
of their non-violent expression of religious beliefs.70 The attitude of 
the government was to pursue political stability and economic 
development, at the expense of the basic rights of its citizens (Lubis, 
1993:12-3).71 
Neo-modernists’ thought on human rights of Muslims in 
Indonesia can be seen from the way they have responded to three 
significant challenges of reconciliation between Islam and the modern 
conception of human rights; including women’s rights, religious 
freedom and minority rights, and issues of corporal punishment.  
Women’s Rights  
Although Muslim women in Indonesia do not enjoy human rights 
in the same way as women in the Western society, compared to other 
Muslim countries (especially Egypt) they seem to fare better. In 
particular, it relates to the issues of women’s participation in public 
                                                 
70 D. F. Orentlicher, Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor (Washigton, DC: The Asia 
Watch Committee, 1989), pp. 75-121. 
71 After Suharto fell, the situation with human rights has improved, especially the 
freedom of expression, and political participation. It can be seen from the large 
number of political parties (48) that participated in the 1999 election (Freedom House, 
2002). Moreover, religious freedom has also taken a positive step; the government in 
2000 under Abdurrahman Wahid recognised the existence of Confucianism as a 
religion (Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism). The rights of the 
Chinese minority are accommodated by allowing using the Chinese language and 
pursuing other cultural activities that previously had been banned by Suharto regime. 
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sphere. Istiadah argues that participation of Muslim women in the 
Indonesian public sphere has increased significantly in the last decade, 
especially in the education sector and workplaces.72 Whereas women 
cannot participate in public sphere in many Muslim countries, women 
in Indonesia can even become a president of the country.  
That Indonesia ever had a woman as a president; it does not 
necessarily reflect that the rights of all women in Indonesia have 
improved. In fact, in some areas women still suffer from 
discrimination, for example, workplace inequality, domestic violence, 
and sex trafficking.73 However, the appearance of Megawati as the 
president of Indonesia at least shows the world that the political 
system and Islam (although not the official religion) of Indonesia are 
accommodating towards women. Furthermore, it shows that Muslims 
in Indonesia respect to the women’s rights in public sphere. 
The improvement of Muslim women’s participation in public 
sector is as a result of the campaign of neo-modernists who resist a 
patriarchal interpretation of the Qur’anic verse on women’s status in 
Islam.74 The most popular verse concerning women’s status in Islam is 
the QS Annissa: 34, which regulates the rights and responsibility 
between men and women. In interpreting this verse, neo-modernist 
Muslims like Abdurrahman Wahid argue that the word “lead” 
(qowwamun) in this verse has an anthropological meaning, which 
indicates that this verse is not the transcendental norm; rather this 
verse explains the situation at the time this verse was revealed.75 
Moreover, in relation to the issues of women’s role at home, Mas’udi 
argues that they remain important especially as an educator for their 
children but that they should not neglect their role in the public 
                                                 
72 Istiadah, Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia: investigating paths to resist the patriarchal 
system, CSES, Working Paper No 91 (Clayton: Monash University, 1995), p. 2. 
73 S. R. Dzuhayatin, “Women, globalization and spirituality”, Islamic Millennium Journal, 
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2001), pp. 132-133. 
74 Istiadah, “Muslim Women in Contemporary Indonesia”, p. 9. 
75 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Religious Pluralism: democratisation in Indonesia—an asses-
ment”, in Democratization in Indonesia, Stockholm: IDEA. Available online http://-
www.idea.int/publications/democratization_in_indonesia/11_religious_pluralism.pdf 
(2003)[accessed 27 August 2003]. 
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sphere.76 While a wife works for income, Mas’udi argues that the 
income will belong to her personally.77 Commenting on a wife’s 
obligation to obey her husband, Ali Yafie argues that husband’s 
consent is not absolute.78 For instance, a wife who refuses to have sex 
with her husband is not automatically sinful. This implies that 
domestic violence should not happen to women. 
A controversial Islamic message on women’s status in Islam is the 
Hadith from Abu Bakar, transmitted through Bukhari, Nasa’i and 
others, which specifies that “society will not survive (prosper) if it 
submits its affairs to women”. This Hadith suggests that women, for 
many reasons, cannot hold a top public position or be a leader of the 
community. Responding to this, Muhammadiyah, the second largest 
Islamic organisation in Indonesia, has its own interpretations ─ that at 
the time of the Hadith women were not educated and were thus, 
incapable of holding authority.79 Muhammadiyah believes that the 
situation now is quite the reverse, and women are fully capable of 
assuming public responsibility. They are qualified for authority. This 
position is reinforced by QS 16:97. “…We will bestow [on man and 
women] their reward according to the best of their action”.  
Meanwhile, NU has also produced some fatwa > with regard to the 
permissibility of women participating in the public sphere. For 
instance, NU’s fatwa> in 1997 suggested that the status of women in 
society is equal to that of men; women are not subordinated in society. 
This fatwa> also suggests that women can take an active role in the 
public sphere as long as they have capacity and capability.80 In relation 
                                                 
76 M. F. Mas’udi, “Reinterpreting Islamic teaching on women”, in Forum for Islam and 
the Advancement of Women, Islam and the Advancement of Women (Jakarta: The Forum 
for Islam and the Advancement of Women, 1994), p. 27. 
77 Ibid, pp. 27-8. 
78 A. Yafie, “Women’s status and leadership” in Forum for Islam and the Advance-
ment of Women, Islam and the Advancement of Women (Jakarta: The Forum for Islam and 
the Advancement of Women, 1994), p. 107. 
79 M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam Social Change through Contemporary Fatwa (Honolulu: 
ASAA in association with Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), p. 
138. 
80 PBNU dan Lajnah Ta’lif Wan Nasir, Hasil-Hasil Musyawarah Nasional Alim Ulama dan 
Konferensi Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, Tanggal 16-20 Rajab 1418/H 17-21 Nopember 1997 M, 
Di Pondok Pesantren Qamarul Huda Desa Bagu, Prngrata, Lombok Tengah Nusa Tenggara 
Barat (Jakarta: Sekteratiat Jenderal PBNU dan Lajnah Ta’lif Wan Nasir, January 1998), 
pp. 57-60. 
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to the right of women to sit in parliament, NU produced a fatwa in 
1935 which allowed women to hold positions in parliament.81 Similar 
views can also be found in the Collection of Principles of the 
Muhammadiyah Council of Opinion (Himpunan Putusan Majlis Tarjih 
Muhamadiyah), which suggests that women can be active in the public 
sphere, including the political arena, because their capacity enables 
them to do that The reason is simple, women now have better 
education than previously.82  
Religious Freedom and Minority Rights  
The commitment of Muslims in Indonesia to the issue of religious 
freedom and minority rights has been strong since independence was 
gained 1945. Although Muslims form the majority of population, they 
agreed to not establish an Islamic state. Instead, they agreed that the 
country was based on patriotic, humanist and religious values, that later 
formed what is called Pancasila. It represents an ideology of tolerance in 
Indonesia (Ramage, 1995).83 Then, in reality, Indonesia has often been 
held up as an example of religious pluralism successfully implemented 
in one country where one religion, Islam, is the faith of a large majority 
of the population.84 Although in the last several years the country has 
witnessed some religious and ethnic conflicts, many believe that those 
conflicts are not solely triggered by religion. The causes of the conflicts 
are multi-layered, and the conflicts are provoked by power struggle 
between rival elites.85 
Over the past 50 years, many fundamentalist Islamic groups have 
sporadically sought to establish an Islamic state, but the country’s 
                                                 
81 M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam Social Change through Contemporary Fatwa, (Honolulu: 
ASAA in association with Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai’i Press, 2003), p. 
138. 
82 Ibid, pp. 137-8. 
83 In this regard, Nurcholish argues that the ideology of Pancasila is compatible with 
Islam and it contains the spirit of the Madinah Charter. For Indonesian Muslims, 
accepting the ideology of Pancasila, is a guarantee of the harmony of religious pluralism 
in Indonesia (1983:10).  
84 B. Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2001); M. Woodward, 
“Indonesia, Islam and the prospect for democracy”, SAIS Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 
(2001). 
85 Martin Van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indone-
sia”, South East Asia Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2002), pp. 117; Abdurrahman Wahid, 
“Religious Pluralism”, [accessed 27 August 2003]. 
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mainstream Muslim community, including influential organisations 
such as the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama, continued to reject 
the idea. Proponents of an Islamic state argued unsuccessfully in 1945 
and throughout the parliamentary democracy period of the 1950s for 
the inclusion of clauses (the so called “Jakarta Charter”) in the 
Constitution’s preamble making it obligatory for Muslims to follow the 
Shari >‘ah. During the Suharto regime, advocacy of an Islamic state was 
forbidden. With the loosening of restrictions on freedom of speech 
and religion that followed the fall of Suharto in May 1998, proponents 
of the “Jakarta Charter” resumed their advocacy efforts. The secular 
political parties and appointed police, military and functional 
representatives, who together hold a majority of the seats in the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), oppose proposals to amend 
the constitution to include the Shari >‘ah. The Muhammadiyah, the NU 
and many prominent Muslim clerics also oppose such a charge.86 
The idea of secularisation is supported by prominent Muslim 
intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. 
Both scholars argue that secularisation is necessary for a plural society 
like Indonesia, and the position of religious teaching, including the 
Shari >‘ah, can be addressed by stressing the ethical aspects of religion.87 
Thus, the state maintains the neutral stance vis-a-vis the religion in order 
to guarantee religious freedom to the public. Therefore, Wahid argues 
that any government regulation on religious activities is contrary to the 
idea of religious freedom and pluralism.88 During the Suharto era, the 
government produced laws to maintain religious pluralism in 
Indonesia. For instance, the Marriage Act of 1974 was an attempt to 
weaken the Islamic courts in relation to polygamy issues, which caused 
great consternation among some Muslim leaders.  
With regard to the rights of minorities, non-Muslims in Indonesia 
are not regarded as dhimmi but citizens of equal standing. There is no 
discrimination against any religion in employment, education, housing 
and health. Non-Muslims can have a top position in the public arena. 
                                                 
86 US Department of State, ‘Egypt’, International Religious Freedom Report 2003, 
Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2003a. Available online at http://www.-
state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13994.htm [accessed on 11 May 2003]. 
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lish Madjid, Paper presented at the The Fifth Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern 
Studies, Lund University (25–28 October 2001), pp. 4-5. 
88 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Religious Pluralism”, p. 205. 
  
 
Human Rights and Islam 
125 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 01, June 2007 
The country has witnessed many non-Muslims (Christian, Hindu, and 
others) with a high rank in the military and civilian hierarchy. Although 
there has not yet non-Muslims been a president, there are some 
ministers, governors or city majors are non-Muslims.89 
The conception of dhimmi, according to Sadzali, is not relevant in 
the 21st century. It was the old practice of Islam which was only 
relevant in the 8th century.90 Moreover, Indonesia was not a conquered 
by Islamic invader instead; country emerged from the common 
consciousness of its citizens to establish a nation state, Indonesia. 
Sadzali suggests that to maintain a tolerant attitude between religious 
followers in Indonesia is to refer to the spirit of the covenant of 
Medina, where the Prophet has laid a foundation to create an Islamic 
community based on religious and ethnic pluralism.91  
Corporal Punishment 
The attitude of Muslims in Indonesia seems to be ambiguous on 
the issue of corporal punishment. On the one hand, Muslims recognize 
the state’s penal codes, but on the others hand the ulama (Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah) recognise the existence of Islamic penal 
codes, including rajam and h}udd punishment. At the state level itself, 
practices of torture continue to prevail, especially among military and 
police involved in areas of conflict, such as Aceh, Papua and Maluku.92 
The death penalty is also applied to those convicted of drug trafficking, 
severe crimes or terror, like perpetrators of the Bali Bombing.93 
However, there are almost no cases reported regarding the abuse based 
on Shari>‘ah.  
There have been only two cases in relation to rajam and a threat of 
death penalty for liberal Muslims. However, these two cases did not 
receive any support either from the Muslim society or the government. 
The first case is the carrying out of rajam in Maluku in 2001. This 
punishment was conducted by Ja’far Thalib, a leader of Laskar Jihad on 
                                                 
89 US Department of State, ‘Egypt’. 
90 Munawir Sadzali, “Penegakan HAM dalam Pluralisme Agama: Tinjauan Konsepsio-
nal” in Anshari Thayib et. Al., HAM dan Pluralisme Agama (Surabaya, Indonesia: PKSK, 
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91 Ibid, p. 55. 
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a follower (Abdullah) who had committed the sin of adultery. In this 
case, the police has arrested and charged Ja’far Thalib, the perpetrator 
of the punishment with causing the death of another person.94 The 
Indonesian police argue that rajam is not recognised by the Indonesian 
law. 
Other case was a threat of death penalty to a liberal Islamic activist, 
in December 2002. The Forum of Indonesian Clerics and Islamic 
Followers called on the police to investigate Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, the 
leader of Liberal Islam Network, for writing an article that urged a less 
literal interpretation of Islamic doctrine. The article stated that some 
aspects of the Shari >‘ah, such as cutting off the hands of thieves, might 
not be applicable in this culture and this century. The Bandung-based 
Indonesian People's Ulama Forum, a group of religious scholars, called 
the article an insult to Islam. They stated that, according to Islam, a 
person who insulted Islam should be sentenced to death. However, the 
police did not arrest Ulil, and the religious scholars later distanced 
themselves from their earlier statement, saying they had not meant that 
Ulil should be sentenced to death.95 
The two cases above show that there is still ambiguity amongst 
Muslims in Indonesia toward the issue of punishment according to the 
Shari >‘ah. Fortunately, prominent liberal Muslims like Abdurrahman 
Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and among the younger generation Ulil 
Abdalla constantly affirm the need to reinterpret the text of classical 
Shari >‘ah. Quoting Ibn ‘Abd al-Salam, an Islamic jurist who lived eight 
centuries ago, Wahid argues that some practices of the Islamic penal 
codes, like rajam and hand amputation, are inapplicable in the modern 
society.96 This is not only because they would violate the principles of 
humanity, but because there are many conditions that should be 
fulfilled before those penal codes are put into practice. 
Conclusion  
The preceding discussion reflects the pluralism of Muslim 
responses to the modern, secular perspectives on human rights. On 
the one hand, the conservative argument seems to be more dominant 
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in Egypt, while in Indonesia the moderate-liberal argument seems to 
prevail in the public debate on human rights. In other words, Muslims 
in both countries have different attitudes toward international 
standards of human rights. However, despite the difference, there is a 
similar trend in the way Muslims take part in the discourse of human 
rights. That is, Muslims’ participation in the human rights discourse is 
determined by the dynamic tensions among three interconnected 
poles. The first pole is conservative Islam, which argues that Islam is a 
religion whose universal claims encompass the realm of human rights. 
The second pole is liberal or reformist, and argues that the modern, 
secular-based concept of universal human rights is compatible with 
Islam. The third pole, the most complex, is the state’s own 
interpretation of human rights principles in accordance with national 
interests real or imagined. 
The fact that Islam contains universal principles, which may or 
may not be compatible with the secular-based universal principles of 
human rights, is beyond dispute. Because of this, tensions between the 
first two poles are influenced by the ways in which Islamic groups and 
leaders interpret such universal principles. They are also influenced by 
the responses from advocates of secular-based human rights principles 
to certain Islamic principles.  
Thus, coming to grips with the diversity of opinions on, and 
interpretations of, basic principles advocated by different groups 
within the Islamic community is important. For instance, the 
conservatives maintain that Islamic teaching can never be reconciled 
with ideas and practices based upon secularist foundations.97 
Nevertheless, for those Muslims with liberal inclinations, such 
reconciliation and cooperation between the two are at least 
theoretically possible and worth trying in the real world. In this regard, 
Monshipouri argues that “fusing secular and Islamic principles can 
effectively promote human dignity.”98 
Conservatives advocate legal formalistic strategies in putting their 
ideas into practice, while moderates advocate transformative and 
gradual approaches through inculcating Islamic ethics in society. The 
first approach is based on the idea that the formalisation of Islam in all 
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dimensions of life, through laws and supported by the state, is the only 
option to fully implement Islamic teachings. The necessity of 
establishing an Islamic state or developing an Islamic society based on 
the Shari >‘ah as a prerequisite is indispensable.99 
On the contrary, the second approach maintains that the 
formalisation of Islamic teachings by imposing the Shari >‘ah is not the 
only option, and it could even be dangerous in a pluralist society. 
Developing a modern society in which Islam will attempt to influence 
its moral and ethical bases without using legal formalistic means is 
important. Islam, in this view, is but one among many value systems 
that exist in society and should not claim to be the only alternative for 
the development of the new society.100 If the second approach is 
rights, then the main task is to determine common ground on which 
Islam can promote human rights with other forces. 
Turning now to the third pole, namely the state’s interests, which is 
the most complicated one. The dynamic relations between Islamic 
forces and the state in both countries, has a tremendous impact on the 
efforts of Islamic groups willing to work in the field of human rights. 
But it is not simple; in fact Islam as a political and social force in both 
countries has been disunited on the issue of human rights. This is 
partly because of the state’s strategy of co-optation – for instance, the 
establishment of religious authority in both Egypt and Indonesia. The 
establishment religious authority in many instances has interpreted 
religious teachings according to the interests of government. In 
Indonesia, the MUI (Majelis ulama Indonesia, the Council of Ulama) has 
supported the government’s program on Keluarga Berencana (family 
planning) by producing a fatwa on this issue.101  
In Egypt, the religious establishment has been useful for the 
Egyptian government in supporting government policies. The most 
striking example was the Azhar decision, following the Camp David 
Accords, to proclaim that peace with the Israel was in agreement with 
Qur’anic injunctions, reversing its previous position, which forbade 
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such an outcome. In domestic politics also the ulama would buttress 
government policies with elaborate Islamic justifications, which include 
the fatwa of Abd al-Halim Mahmud, the Azhar’s sheikh, about 
communism in 1976, declaring it heretical and asserting that Islam 
sanctions private property and individual endeavour, and in 1961 when 
the Mufti of Egypt sanctioned the socialist path of development.102 
Meanwhile, there is an interesting phenomenon that, in both Egypt 
and Indonesia, the commitment of Islamists or conservative Islam to 
human rights issues is motivated by same reasons: ideological and 
strategic interest. The first is their rejection of secular and western 
values, while the second is a long-term strategy of Islamising the 
political culture. In such an environment, advocates of human rights in 
the Muslim community face increasing pressure from both the state 
and Islamist groups. Their voices are muted and suppressed by 
censorship or harassment, making it difficult for them to participate 
openly in the discourse and practices regarding human rights issues in 
both countries.  
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